FIRST AMENDMENT-FREE

SPEECH-A PROPHYLACTIC BAN ON

PERSONAL SOLICITATION BY CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS IN
A BUSINESS CONTEXT VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S
ANTEE

GuAR-

OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH-Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct.

1792 (1993).
The "commercial speech doctrine" applies the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech' to expressions proposing a com1 U.S. CONST. amend. I (declaring that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech"). The concept of free speech originated in ancient Athens
sometime between 800 B.C. and 600 B.C., where some citizens were given a right to
speak on most issues without fear of government retribution. THOMAS L. TEDFORD,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2d ed. 1993). Athenian citizens were
punished only for slanderous, impious, or seditious speech. Id. The Roman Republic
granted a similar freedom of speech to its citizens. Id. Beginning with the Roman
Empire, however, speech in opposition to the government required the approval of
the emperor, which gave rise to the long standing exercise of "dissent by permission"
in Western society. Id. at 4-5.
The signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 by KingJohn of Englard and the rise of
the English Parliament, particularly the House of Commons, triggered a resurgence
of the right to free speech for purposes of parliamentary debate. Id. at 5; DAVID S.
BOGEN, BULWARK OF LIBERTY-THE COURT AND THE

FirsT

AMENDMENT 8

(1984).

Strengthened throughout several centuries, the right to free speech during legislative
argument was considered fundamental in both England and its former American colonies by the time the United States Constitution was adopted in 1787. TEDFORD,
supra, at 9. The fundamental right to freedom of speech in legislative debate was
ensconced by the framers of the Constitution, which proclaims that "for any Speech
or Debate in either House .... [senators and representatives] shall not be questioned
in any other Place." Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6).
Seventeenth and eighteenth century social contract theorists, including John
Locke, further influenced America's founding fathers with the idea that certain rights
were naturally imbued upon all of mankind. Id. at 20-21. Such rights included the
freedoms of thought and expression. Id. at 21 (quoting Cato's Letters, No. 62). Professor Bogen observed that in that era, although legislative debate associated freedom
of speech with governmental functions, the doctrine of natural rights expanded the
general applicability of free speech and similar rights to all. Id. at 20.
The publication of essays known as Cato's Letters, supporting the ideals of natural law, greatly influenced America's founding fathers, including Benjamin Franklin
and James Madison. Id. at 17. This collection of essays argued that free speech was a
natural right, appropriately immune from governmental interference, unless the
right's exercise resulted in injury to another. Id. at 18. Letter Number 15, entitled
"Of Freedom of Speech: That the same is inseparable from Public Liberty," stated:
Without Freedom of Thought, there can be no such Thing as Wisdom;
and no such Thing as publick Liberty, without Freedom of Speech:
Which is the Right of every Man, as far as by it he does not hurt and
controul the Right of another; and this is the only Check which it ought
to suffer, the only Bounds which it ought to know .... Freedom of
Speech is the great Bulwark of Liberty; they prosper and die together
Id. (quoting Cato's Letters, No. 15).
Legal commentators have argued that the United States Supreme Court's mod-
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Commercial speech has not always received

ern approach to the protection of free speech is founded upon the classic "marketplace of ideas" theory. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF
SPEECH 7-8, 11-12 (1989) [hereinafter HUMAN LIBERTY] (asserting that the Supreme
Court's approach to free speech is premised on an understanding that truth is objective and that people are rationally able to weigh competing ideas to make informed
decisions). This modem approach regarding the right to free speech began with
Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States. Id. at 7-8 & n.7 (quoting Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (HolmesJ., dissenting)). In Abrams, the majority upheld the conviction of a man accused of fostering discontent and anarchy by
publishing pamphlets protesting the involvement of American troops in Russia during World War I. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 623-24. Justice Holmes, joined by justice Brandeis, dissented, arguing that the majority's conclusion failed to recognize the
importance of debate in a free society. Id. at 630-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The
dissent stated:
[W] hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ....
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
The Court continued to delineate the parameters of the marketplace of ideas
theory in Roth v. United States. HUMAN LIBERTY, supra, at 8-9 (citing Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957)). The Roth Court defined protected speech as
"[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance." Roth, 354 U.S. at
484. The Court, however, narrowed this potentially broad definition of protected
speech in Miller v. California See DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 829 (1989) (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973));
TEDFORD, supra, at 153. The Miller Court defined unprotected expression as speech
lacking "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
The Miller Court's definition of non-First Amendment speech has continued relevance today, although its application is principally limited to cases involving obscenity.
See TEDFORD, supra, at 153.
Despite the Court's reliance on the marketplace of ideas theory in its analysis of
cases involving free speech, commentators have offered alternative methods for justifying the right. See, e.g., HUMAN LIBERTY, supra, at 47-51 (arguing for a "liberty" approach to justify free speech). Professor Baker rejected the "marketplace"
justification for First Amendment protection, proposing that the marketplace approach is based on an exterior, majoritarian definition of truth. Id. at 12, 47. The
author instead would draw on the values of individual self-fulfillment and the ability
of the individual to participate in change. Id. at 47. But see Martin H. Redish, The
Value Of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (contending that the right to
freedom of speech serves the sole goal of "individual self-realization"). Professor Redish argued that Baker's "liberty" and "self-fulfillment" labels are too narrow in scope
and fail to protect commercial speech. See id. at 593-94. In contrast, Professor Baker
maintained that commercial speech "does not represent an attempt to create or affect
the world in a way which can be expected to represent anyone's private or personal
wishes." C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem In The Theoy Of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REv. 1, 3 (1976).
2 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973) (holding advertisements proposing no more than a commercial
transaction to be "classic examples of commercial speech"). In Pittsburgh Press, the
Court determined that a city ordinance forbidding newspapers from publishing gender-based employment opportunity advertising did not violate the First Amendment.
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First Amendment protection, however, and its inclusion with other
types of speech that historically have received such protection remains qualified.' The qualifications notwithstanding, the commerId. at 391. The Court did not reach the ultimate issue of whether commercial speech
should receive First Amendment protection. Id. at 388. Rather, the majority concluded that the illegality of gender-discriminating advertising rendered the newspaper's activities outside of the purview of protected First Amendment speech. Id. at
388, 391.
In a case subsequent to Pittsburgh Press, the Supreme Court further designated
commercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561, 572 (1980) (citations omitted) (holding that a complete
ban on advertising by an electric utility violates the First Amendment). But see Bernadette Miragliotta, FirstAmendment: The Special Treatment of Legal Advertising, 1990 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 597, 597 (1992) (postulating that the commercial speech doctrine is not
an application of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech, but rather represents the Supreme Court's concern for the dissemination of commercial information
in the American capitalist system); Edward J. Eberle, PracticalReason: The Commercial
Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 411, 444 (1992) (arguing that the Court's
definition of commercial speech-dealing with advertising, promotion, and solicitation-fails to address the broader category of corporate, business, and securities
speech). Professor Eberle argues that the extension of First Amendment protection
to commercial speech cannot be justified by any single theory, but instead must be
approached pragmatically by utilizing a network of interlocking values. Id. at 415.
3 See Eberle, supra note 2, at 461. Political, scientific, and cultural expressions,
also known as "core speech," are generally recognized as having greater First Amendment value than other types of speech, including commercial speech. Id. Professor
Eberle contended, however, that commercial speech directly advances values essential
to a democracy, such as liberty and autonomy. Id. A pragmatic rationale for allowing
the regulation of commercial speech derives from the state's function in effectively
affirming the truthfulness of commercial speech. Id. at 474. Professor Eberle maintained that the state's function is to ensure that " ' the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely.'" Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976)). In dictum,
the Virginia Pharmacy Court stated that the application of the First Amendment to
commercial speech was not meant to prohibit the state's continued regulation of the
pharmaceutical profession. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72. But see HuMAN LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 196-97 (asserting that commercial speech reflects a profit-based
market force which does not further individual liberty but instead involves people
exercising power over others).
Some commentators rationalize the government's ability to regulate commercial
expression, arguing that such regulation would not result in the chilling of speech.
See, e.g., Eberle, supra note 2, at 472-73 (insisting that commercial speech is more
durable than other types of speech, such as political, due to the importance of commercial speech to the generation of profit). But see Redish, supra note 1, at 633 (questioning the validity of the distinction between commercial and political speech).
Professor Redish, however, contended that a distinction between commercial and
political speech incorrectly assumes that facts espoused by a commercial speaker are
more easily verified than facts asserted by a political speaker. Id. Hypothesizing that
the regulation of commercial speech would deter advertisers from making certain
assertions about their product, Professor Redish also questioned the conclusion of
some legal theorists that commercial speech is hardier than political speech. Id.; see
also Richard A. Posner, Free Speech In An Economic Perspective, 20 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 1,
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cial speech doctrine imposes substantial limitations on
governmental attempts at restricting commercial speech.4
Although the commercial speech doctrine has been enthusiastically received by advertisers, 5 it remains a controversial subject,
particularly in the professional community.6 The controversy
stems from the government's communitarian interest in protecting
its citizens from harmful commercial speech 7 and the opposing
First Amendment interest in disseminating information.' The de10 (1986) (questioning generally the rationale for ranking types of speech and particularly the favoring of political speech over economic speech).
4 David Rownd, Note, Muting The Commercial Speech Doctrine: Board of Trustees of
the State University of New York v. Fox, 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 275, 275
(1990). The commercial speech doctrine balances the First Amendment's aim of
freely publicizing information with the state's desire to protect its citizens by regulating commerce. Id. The author contrasted this modem day balancing test with the
rationale used by the Supreme Court in the early case of Valentine v. Chrestensen. Id. at
275 & n.3 (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942)). In Valentine,
the Court afforded no protection at.all to pure commercial speech. Id. See infra
notes 43-45 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of Valentine. The
Supreme Court later promulgated a test providing commercial speech with some
measure of constitutional protection. See Eberle, supra note 2, at 480-81 (analyzing
the modem four-part requirement for the regulation of commercial speech under
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. PublicService Commission of New York). See infra
notes 75-80 and accompanying text for an analysis of Central Hudson.
5 See Bruce P. Keller, The Tension Between the FirstAmendment and Regulatory Efforts,
in FALSE ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 1993, at 7, 9 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. B-806, 1993) (observing that advertisers rejoiced when
the Court extended First Amendment protection to commercial speech in 1976).
6 See, e.g., Al H. Ringleb et al., Lawyer Direct Mail Advertisements: Regulatory Environment, Economics, and Common Perceptions, 17 PAC. L.J. 1199, 1199 n.1 (1986) (quoting
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger's comment made at the American Bar Association's
Commission on Advertising that potential legal clients should be warned to "'never,
never, never under any circumstances'" retain an attorney who advertises).
7 See Eberle, supra note 2, at 470; see also HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 197
(proposing that commercial speech adds nothing to the First Amendment ideal of
personal liberty and autonomy); cf.Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce
and Communication, 71 TEX. L. REv. 697, 724, 727-28 (1993) (advocating that First
Amendment protection should be withdrawn from modern-image based advertising,
as opposed to classified-type advertising, because image-based advertising does not
disseminate useful information to the consumer and reduces a "citizen democracy" to
a "commercial democracy").
But see Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the FirstAmendment: A Casefor
Expansive Protectionof CommercialSpeech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 777, 780, 801 (1993) (arguing,
in response to Collins and Skover, that imagistic advertising has not been shown to be
inherently harmful and that First Amendment protection should not be withdrawn
from commercial speech, in general, without an actual showing of harm or the substantial likelihood that harm will occur).
8 Eberle, supranote 2, at 448. Professor Eberle observed that commercial speech
disseminates information to the consumer, thereby increasing the consumer's overall
knowledge. Id. Increased knowledge, the professor continued, adds to an individual's ability to engage in self-realization. Id.
Legal commentators have debated over whether commercial speech is truly de-
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bate is heightened when the doctrine is applied to professionals
because of the palpable disdain traditionally held by the professional community for certain forms of commercial speech.9 Juxtaposed with that disdain is the increasing need for some
professionals, in an ever-crowded and more competitive world, to
distinguish themselves in the eyes of the public. 10 The need to balance these legitimate interests is perhaps best demonstrated by the
evolution of judicial doctrine in the area of in-person solicitation
by professionals.11
In a recent case, Edenfield v. Fane,"2 the United States Supreme
Court held that the personal solicitation of prospective business
clients by certified public accountants could not be prophylactically banned." In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the
serving of First Amendment protection. For example, Professor Baker argued that
"[F] irst [A] mendment theory requires a complete denial of [F] irst [A] mendment protection for commercial speech." HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 1, at 196. Professor Redish, however, disagreed with Professor Baker's proposal that commercial speech is not
deserving of First Amendment protection. See Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, And Freedom Of Expression: A Reply To Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. Rv. 678,
679 (1982). But see Posner, supra note 3, at 40 (arguing that it is paradoxical to grant
First Amendment protection to product advertising when the product itself can be
heavily regulated by the government). Professor Redish's disagreement with Professor Baker extends from the professors' respective positions on the relevancy of the
receipt, as opposed to the expression, of information. Id. (citing C. Edwin Baker,
Realizing Self-Realization: CorporatePolitical Expenditures And Redish's The Value Of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646, 646, 652 (1982)). Although he observed Professor
Baker's belief that profit-motivated expressions undermine individual self-realization,
Professor Redish posited that the receipt of information also advances the First
Amendment. Id. at 679. Accordingly, Professor Redish contended that the source of
the motivation for expressing ideas is largely immaterial. Id.
9 See Smolla, supranote 7, at 783 (observing that professionals, as members of the
intelligentsia, live for the "life of the mind" and naturally harbor disdain for expression, the sole purpose of which is to sell goods and services); cf Judith L. Maute,
Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising and SolicitationRules Under Commercial Speech and Antitrust
Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 508 (1986) (explaining that professionals regarded solicitation as an even greater threat to professional dignity than advertising
because it involved direct contact with potential clients).
10 Miragliotta, supra note 2, at 598; see also Stephanie W. Kanwit, Attorneys'Responsibilities to Ensure that ProfessionalAdvertising is Truthful and Nondeceptive, 77 ILL. B.J. 414,
414 (1989) (observing that the application of the commercial speech doctrine to attorneys creates new opportunities for lawyers to advertise their services).
11 See Eberle, supra note 2, at 503 (arguing that solicitation can be both harmful
and beneficial). Professor Eberle rationalized that while solicitation stunts the information-gathering process, thereby reducing the listener's ability to engage in a rational thought process, it also opens an additional path for the exchange of
information. Id.
12 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
13 Id. at 1802. The First Amendment implications at stake in Edenfield were not lost
on scholars when the Supreme Court decided to hear the case. SeeJohn C. Coots,
Note, A Missed Opportunity to Definitively Apply the Central Hudson Test: Fane v. Eden-
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notion that all professionals could be subject to a per se ban on
solicitation. 14 Instead, the Court held that the validity of such bans
would be determined by the context of the particular circumstances and the characteristics of both the affected professional
and the prospective client.15
Scott Fane, a certified public accountant licensed by the State
of Florida, endeavored to create an accounting practice in that
state.' 6 In furtherance of that goal, Fane planned to establish a
client base by making unsolicited telephone calls to business executives. 7 During the ensuing conversation, Fane would attempt to
arrange for an in-person meeting with the executive to discuss the
scope of Fane's practice.18 Florida, however, broadly proscribed
uninvited solicitation of non-clients by accountants.' 9 Accordingly,
Florida's State Board of Accountancy (Board), charged with enfield, 26 CREIGHroN L. REV. 1155, 1190-91 (1993) (fearing that the Eleventh Circuit's
decision-that a ban on in-person solicitation by certified public accountants violated
the First Amendment-would be jeopardized on appeal to the Supreme Court because of the circuit court's cursory application of the Central Hudson test); see also
Brian J. King, Note, Ambulance-ChasingAccountants?: In-Person Solicitation And The Professions, 34 B.C. L. REv. 561, 563 (1993) (urging the Court to adhere to the balancing
test of weighing the cost and benefit of commercial advertising by professionals when
it hears Fane).
14 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1802.
15 Id. The Supreme Court distinguished between the functions of certified public
accountants (CPAs) and other professionals, notably attorneys. Id. at 1802-03. The
Court further recognized a contextual difference in the solicitation of businesspeople
as distinct from private individuals. Id. at 1803. CPAs are licensed by the state in
which they practice and trained to conduct audits of the financial records of business
entities and individuals. WALTER G. KELL & RIcHARD E. ZIEGLER, MODERN AUDITING 7
(2d ed. 1983). Although specific requirements vary from state to state, general licensing requirements include passing a written examination and gaining practical experience in the accounting profession. Id.
16 Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir. 1991), affd, 113. S. Ct. 1792
(1993); Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1796. In addition to being licensed in Florida, Fane was
also a licensed CPA in NewJersey. Fane, 945 F.2d at 1516. Fane had established his
own accounting practice in NewJersey before relocating to Florida in 1985. Edenfield,
113 S. Ct. at 1796.
17 Id. Fane had used this method of solicitation in NewJersey, where it was legal
for him to do so. Id. The law in NewJersey that regulates CPAs is silent on the issue
of personal solicitation. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:2B-23 (West 1991) (defining unlawful acts for public accountants).
18 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1796.
19 Fane, 945 F.2d at 1516. Florida's Administrative Code provides that a licensed
accountant:
[S] hall not by any direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation solicit an engagement to perform public accounting services... where the engagement would be for a person or entity not already a client of the licensee,
unless such person or entity has invited such a communication.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61H1-24.002(2)(c) (1992). The code defines the restricted
activity as "any communication which directly or implicitly requests an immediate oral
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forcing the proscription on accountant
solicitation, prevented
20
Fane from executing his plan.
In response to the Board's enforcement of the statute prohibiting accountant solicitation, Fane filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida requesting declaratory and injunctive relief.2 Fane alleged that the total ban on
solicitation violated his constitutional guarantee of free speech.2 2
The Board justified the sweeping ban by asserting the state's substantial interest in protecting the public by preserving accountant
independence. 23 The district court applied the rationale used by
the United States Supreme Court in CentralHudson Gas and Electric
response from the recipient" and stipulates that "telephone calls to a specific potential client are prohibited." FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61H1-24.002(3) (1992).
20 Fane, 945 F.2d at 1516.
21 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1797. Fred H. Edenfield and others were named in the
lawsuit in their official capacities as members of the Board of Accountancy. Fane, 945
F.2d at 1514, 1516.
22 Id. at 1516.
23 Edenfie/d, 113 S. Ct. at 1799-1800. In arguing for the preservation of accountant
independence, the Board maintained that the attest function, performed exclusively
by CPAs, requires "integrity, independence and objectivity" and that allowing an accountant to solicit new clients could jeopardize those traits. Fane, 945 F.2d at 1517; see
also id. at 1517 n.6 (explaining that the attest function refers to the rendering of an
opinion by a public accountant on the financial position of a client based on either a
review or audit of a client's financial statements).
Accountants have assigned a special meaning to the word "independence." See
KOHLER'S DICTIONARY FOR AccouNTANTS 552 (6th ed. 1990) (defining independence
as "(tihe property of a relation between the accountant and his client (or superior)
such that the accountant's findings and/or reports will be influenced and assembled
in accord with the rules and principles of his professional discipline"). The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) promulgated rules dealing with actions that would impair accountant independence. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC AccouNTANTS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ET 101.02 (1992) (listing
those actions that will impair accountant independence). With particularity, the
Code states that accountant independence is impaired if:
A. During the period of professional engagement or at the time of
expressing an opinion, a member [of the AICPA] or a member's
firm
1. Had or was committed to acquire any direct or material indirect financial interest in the enterprise.
2. Was a trustee of any trust or executor or administrator of any
estate if such trust or estate had or was committed to acquire
any direct or material indirect financial interest in the
enterprise.
3. Had any joint, closely held business investment with the enterprise or with any officer, director, or principal stockholders
thereof that was material in relation to the member's net worth
or to the net worth of the member's firm.
4. Had any loan to or from the enterprise of any officer, director,
or principal stockholder of the enterprise ....
B. During the period covered by the financial statements, during the
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Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York24 to the Board's restriction on Fane's speech.2 5 The court determined that the blanket
restriction of commercial speech violated the First Amendment because the ban did not directly serve the state's asserted interest
and, in addition, was more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest. 26 Accordingly, the district court granted Fane's request
for declaratory relief and issued a broad injunction against the enforcement of Florida's ban on uninvited solicitation of non-clients
27
by accountants.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling, 28 noting that blanket restrictions on commercial speech are generally disfavored.2 9
The court relied on the Central Hudson test to determine that
Fane's proposed solicitation was neither false, misleading, nor related to an illegal activity.30 The court submitted that although the
asserted state interest in regulating the accounting profession was
substantial, Florida had less restrictive avenues available to serve
period of the professional engagement, or at the time of expressing
an opinion, a member or a member's firm
1. Was connected with the enterprise as a promoter, underwriter,
or voting trustee, as a director or officer, or in any capacity
equivalent to that of a member of management or of an
employee.
2. Was a trustee for any pension or profit-sharing trust of the
enterprise.
Id.
24 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). In Central Hudson, the Court formulated a four-part
test to be applied in commercial speech cases. Id. The Court articulated:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Central
Hudson.
25 Fane, 945 F.2d at 1517.
26 Id. at 1517-18.
27 Fane v. Edenfield, No. 88-40264, slip op. at 12-13 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 1990);
Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1797.
28 Fane, 945 F.2d at 1520.
29 Id. at 1517 (citing Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988)). In
Shapero, the Supreme Court held that states could no longer prohibit profit motivated
attorneys from soliciting potential clients with truthful, non-deceptive letters pertaining to particularized legal problems. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 479. The Fane court also
noted that the mere potential for random harm did notjustify a blanket ban of commercial speech. Fane, 945 F.2d at 1517 (citing Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476).
30 Id. at 1517-19; see supra note 24 (reciting the Central Hudson test).
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that interest."1 Moreover, the court rejected the Board's alternative argument that all professionals, including accountants, could
be prophylactically banned from engaging in personal solicitation.3" Affirming the lower court's ruling, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the ban on accountant solicitation from similarly
restrictive, but lawful, bans on solicitation involving other
professions. 3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 34 to determine whether Florida's proscription of in-person solicitation by
accountants violated the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech, given the Supreme Court's prior approval of a similar ban
31 Fane, 945 F.2d at 1518-19. The court asserted that Florida has laws in place to
regulate accountants and alleviate the harms expressed by the Board of Accountancy
without need to resort to a total ban on solicitation. Id. For instance, accountants are
prohibited from the "[p] erformance of any fraudulent act while holding a license to
practice public accounting." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 473.323(1)(k) (West 1991). Moreover, accountants are proscribed from giving "an opinion on the financial statements
of an enterprise unless he and his firm are independent with respect to such enterprise." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 473.315(1) (West 1991).
The Court also repudiated the Board's alternative assertion that the ban on solicitation was a reasonable restriction on the time, place, or manner of accountants'
right to free speech. Fane, 945 F.2d at 1519. The court of appeals noted that while
content-based restrictions are generally unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has held
that reasonable, content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, and manner of
speech survive First Amendment scrutiny. Id. (citations omitted); see, e.g., Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 48-49 (1983) (holding that public
school teachers' mailboxes do not constitute a public forum and that selective access
to outside organizations may be engaged in by the school district); see also Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986) (finding that a city's zoning restriction
on the location of an adult movie theater did not constitute a content-based time,
place, or manner restriction). The Fane court determined that Florida's total proscription of accountant solicitation went further than a reasonable time, place, or
manner restriction. Fane, 945 F.2d at 1519. Specifically, the majority found that the
ban was a focussed proscription of a particular category of expression. Id.
32 Id. at 1520. The Board's rationale for making such an argument was based on
the actual and perceived role of professionals in society and the state's particular interest in regulating them. Id. at 1518-19.
33 Id. at 1519-20. The Fane court distinguished the present facts from those at issue
in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n and National Funeral Services, Inc. v. Rockefeller. Id.
(citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978); National Funeral
Servs., Inc. v. Rockefeller, 870 F.2d 136, 146 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966
(1989)). In Ohralik, the Supreme Court upheld a ban on personal solicitation of accident victims by lawyers. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468. In NationalFunera4 the Fourth Circuit upheld a ban on personal solicitation by morticians selling pre-need funeral
contracts. National Funeral, 870 F.2d 136, 140, 146 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966
(1989). Confining its analysis to the funeral services profession, the National Funeral
court considered the potential harm relative to the solicitation of potential clients of
pre-need funeral services. Id. at 142-45. The Fane court determined that a ban on
accountant solicitation, unlike the bans upheld in Ohralik and National Funera4 was
not necessary. Fane, 945 F.2d at 1520 (citations omitted).
34 Edenfield v. Fane, 112 S.Ct. 2272 (1992).
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affecting attorney solicitation. 35 The majority affirmed the Eleventh Circuit, rejecting the Board's argument that all professions
could be subject to bans on personal solicitation without distinction.3 6 Whether a total ban on commercial speech engaged in by
professionals satisfies constitutional requirements, the Court held,
will depend upon the context of each case and the characteristics
of both the professional and the targeted client.3 7 Applying the
CentralHudson analysis, the Court determined that, in this case, the
blanket prohibition on accountant solicitation did not directly fur38

ther the state's substantial interests.
The commercial speech doctrine, applied by the Court in Edenfield, is a relatively new constitutional creation 31 that has led to
much controversy among American legal commentators and scholars.4" There is strong evidence to suggest, however, that earlier
35 Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1796 (1993). The Court had previously upheld a ban on in-person attorney solicitation of accident victims in Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text
for further discussion of Ohralik.
36 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1802, 1804.
37 Id. at 1802.
38 Id. at 1800.
39 See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-Histoy and Pre-Histoiy of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 747, 756 (1993) (proposing that familiarity with the term "commercial speech" is not the result of a long history of use by the courts, and expressing
that "it comes as a shock to discover that the earliest use of the phrase in any published opinion of any court was only two decades ago"); see also Business Executives'
Move for Vietnam Peace v. F.C.C., 450 F.2d 642, 658 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (using the
term "commercial speech" for the first time in holding that such expression fails to
communicate ideas and therefore falls outside of the ambit of the First Amendment),
rev'd sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973); cf Maute, supra note 9, at 494 (arguing that because of the recent promulgation of the commercial speech doctrine, the Supreme Court is still in the process of
formulating the doctrine's parameters).
40 Compare HuMAN LIBER-Y, supra note 1, at 196 (advocating "complete denial of
[F] irst [A] mendment protection for commercial speech" because commercial speech
is "logically and intrinsically connected to the structurally enforced requirements of
the market" and not to "anyone's substantive values or personal wishes") and Robert
H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 27-28
(1971) (arguing that the First Amendment is appropriately applied only to political
speech relating to the government's actions, policy, or personnel and not to expressions concerning science, education, commerce, or literature) and Posner, supra note
3, at 40 (maintaining that it is paradoxical to afford First Amendment protection to
the advertising materials of a product when the product itself is subject to extensive
government regulation) with Eberle, supra note 2, at 415, 475-76 (arguing the necessity of a pragmatic approach in applying First Amendment protection to commercial
speech by proposing varying standards that would direct government regulation, depending upon whether the commercial speech at issue is truthful, deceptive, or a
mixture of both) and Redish, supra note 1, at 630 (promoting the extension of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech because the dissemination of information, whether or not profit-motivated, furthers the First Amendment value of self-
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American courts may have approached advertising and solicitation
not as speech issues, but as facets of commerce. 4' Treating commercial expression as a part of commerce allowed the government
to regulate such speech.42 Thus, in the early case of Valentine v.
realization) and Smolla, supranote 7, at 780 (promoting the appropriateness of granting First Amendment protection to commercial speech by contending that commercial speech should be afforded full First Amendment protection absent a reason for
otherwise disqualifying it from such protection). See also Collins & Skover, supranote
7, at 745-46 (proposing that commercial speech advances no value worthy of First
Amendment protection but concluding that the Court's application of the First
Amendment to commercial speech was an inevitable result of rampant consumerism
in America).
41 See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 39, at 756-57 (noting that no reported case
prior to Valentine v. Chrestensen considered advertising or soliciting to be potential
First Amendment speech). Professors Kozinski and Banner related that in Valentine,
the Court treated the speech at issue as "advertising" rather than "commercial
speech." Id. at 757 (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)). The
authors hypothesized that it was the juxtaposition of the word "speech" with commercial matters that eventually led the Court to grant First Amendment protection to
commercial speech in Virginia Pharmacy. Id. at 755, 757. Specifically, the professors
contended that the change in the conception of "advertising" as a facet of business to
"commercial speech," protected by the First Amendment, indicates a subtle deviation
in the way lawyers and judges considered modem advertising. Id. at 757. The authors
lent further support to their thesis by pointing out that in a case pre-dating Valentine,
the Court referred to "soliciting and canvassing" without considering the acts in question to be a form of speech. Id. (citing Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 165
(1939)). Prior to 1931, the First Amendment had not been definitively applied to the
states where most regulations that might have raised a First Amendment issue were
found. Id. at 759-60 (citation omitted). In 1931, however, the Court decided
Stromberg v. California,asserting clearly for the first time that the First Amendment was
incorporated to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 759-60 (citing
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (citations omitted)). Prior to Valentine, the Court was confronted with at least five cases challenging state regulation of
advertising. Id. at 763. In each, the challenge to the law was brought on grounds
other than free speech. Id. at 764; see Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 108, 110-12
(1932) (ruling that a statute prohibiting cigarette advertising on billboards and streetcars did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by allowing the same advertising in
newspapers, did not violate the substantive due process right to property, and, finally,
did not place an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the
Commerce Clause); St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269,
272, 274-75 (1919) (reiterating that an ordinance regulating the size of billboards did
not violate the advertiser's Fourteenth Amendment rights to liberty and property);
Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 528-29, 531 (1917) (holding that
an ordinance regulating the maintenance and control of billboards did not violate
the advertiser's substantive due process rights of liberty or property); Fifth Ave. Coach
Co. v. City of N.Y., 221 U.S. 467, 476-77, 483-84 (1911) (holding that a local ordinance
proscribing advertising on the sides of coaches did not violate the advertiser's Fourteenth Amendment rights to property and equal protection); Halter v. Nebraska, 205
U.S, 34, 39, 45-46 (1907) (holding that a statute barring the use of the American flag
on beer bottles did not deny the bottler's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest).
42 Kozinski & Banner, supra note 39, at 758. The Commerce Clause gives the government broad authority to regulate commerce, providing that "Congress shall have
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Chrestensen,4" the United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld a New York City ordinance proscribing the dissemination of
advertising handbills as an entirely proper governmental regulation of commercial advertising.4 4 The Court rejected Chrestensen's First Amendment claim, revealing the prevailing philosophy
of the time: commercial speech was not within the ambit of First
Amendment protection.4 5
After Valentine, however, the prevailing presumption that the
First Amendment was inapposite to commercial speech began to
wither.4 6 The Supreme Court, although not prepared to announce
First Amendment protections for commercial speech or its subset,
professional solicitation, reached an analogous result in NAACP v.
Button.4 7 In Button, the Court considered Virginia's application
Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
43 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See generally Kozinski & Banner, supra note 39, at 756-59
(discussing the Court's characterization of advertising as non-speech at the time of
the Valentine decision). See supra note 41 for a further discussion of Kozinski & Banner's hypothesis regarding the Court's holding in Valentine.
44 Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53-54. Chrestensen owned a submarine that he brought to
New York City for the purpose of charging fees from curious spectators. Id. at 52-53.
In furtherance of that design, Chrestensen proceeded to print advertising handbills
until he was warned by the Police Commissioner, Valentine, that the disbursement of
such advertisements would violate a city ordinance. Id. at 53. The Court quoted the
New York Sanitation Code, which provided in pertinent part:
No Person shall throw, cast or distribute, or cause or permit to be
thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card, booklet, placard
This section is not inor other advertising matter whatsoever ....
tended to prevent the lawful distribution of anything other than commercial and business advertising matter.
Id. at 53 & n.1 (citation omitted). Valentine also told Chrestensen, however, that
handbills devoted to "'information or a public protest'" were not within the purview
of the ordinance. Id. at 53. Armed with this advice, Chrestensen printed two-sided
circulars, one side containing a protest to the City's refusal to allow him to dock his
submarine at city facilities and the other containing an advertisement for the public
to visit his ship. Id. Chrestensen's arrest followed. Id.
45 Id. at 54; see Kozinski & Banner, supra note 39, at 758. Kozinski and Banner
postulated that in 1942, the Valentine decision "was easy not because the Court
thought of commercial speech as a category of speech deserving no protection, but
because the Court didn't treat the case as involving speech at all." Id.
46 See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (declaring that the ruling in Valentine was "casual, almost offhand," adding
that "it has not survived reflection"). Justice Douglas further declared that the actor's
intent to make a profit was irrelevant to whether speech could come under the protection of the First Amendment. Id. at 514 (Douglas, J., concurring).
47 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963); see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 897 (1991) (arguing that the Court's holding in Buttonthat a statute prohibiting attorney solicitation was unconstitutionally overbroadwould have been inappropriate unless the Court had found the chargeable conduct
to have been arguably constitutional). Professor Munneke remarked that Button gave
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and enforcement of an anti-solicitation law to proscribe certain
methods engaged in by NAACP 48 attorneys in their solicitation of
minorities as potential plaintiffs for civil rights litigation. 49 The
Court determined that the NAACP and its lawyers did not engage
in commercial solicitation, forbidden by Virginia's law, but rather
in political speech.5" Consequently, the Court held that Virginia's
restrictions on the methods used by the NAACP's attorneys violated the rights to free speech and association. 5 ' Further, the
Court rejected Virginia's contention that its restriction on attorney
solicitation was justified by a substantial interest in regulating the
legal profession.5 2 Finding no pecuniary interest on the part of the
NAACP attorneys, or any other strong potential for a conflict of
interest, the Court explained that Virginia had not even established a rational basis to support its restriction of the attorneys'
solicitation efforts.5 3 As a result, the Court preserved the NAACP
attorneys' freedom of speech without deciding whether commercial solicitation by professionals should receive First Amendment
lawyers the right to associate with potential clients in an effort to create and employ
legal service delivery systems that would effectively serve the needs of the potential
clients. Gary A. Munneke, Dances With Nonlawyers: A New PerspectiveOn Law Firm Diversification, 61 FoRDHAM L. REV. 559, 604 (1992).
48 The NAACP, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, is a
non-profit organization whose "basic aims and purposes... are to secure the elimination of all racial barriers which deprive Negro citizens of the privileges and burdens of
equal citizenship rights in the United States." Button, 371 U.S. at 419.
49 Id. at 419-22. The controversy in Button resulted from a Virginia law that provided "[i] t shall be unlawful for any person, corporation, partnership, or association to
act as a runner or capper... to solicit any business for an attorney at law." Id. at 423
(citation omitted). The Virginia court held the NAACP and its lawyers to be in violation of the regulation in question due to their practice of attending community meetings and recommending that the audience retain them for matters pertaining to civil
rights litigation, such as school desegregation. Id. at 417-18, 421.
50 Id. at 429. The Court considered the First Amendment's application to the
NAACP's attorneys' practice of soliciting civil rights clients, deliberating whether solicitation falls outside of the First Amendment's protection of speech. Id. The Court
avoided resolving this contention, however, concluding that the state's labelling of
the NAACP's attorneys' actions as solicitation did not automatically remove the attorneys' actions from First Amendment protection. Id. Rather, the Court concluded
that the NAACP had engaged in constitutionally protected political speech. Id. In
dictum, the Court hypothesized that theoretical discourse without action did not represent the outer limit of First Amendment protected speech. Id. To the contrary, the
Court postulated that the First Amendment protects advocacy of lawful goals from
government interference. Id.
51 Id. at 437. The Court arrived at its conclusion by incorporating the First
Amendment's rights of freedom of speech and association to Virginia through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
52 Id. at 438-44.
53 Id. at 442-43.
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protection.5 4
The ultimate issue over whether commercial speech should receive First Amendment protection was conclusively decided in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.5 5
In Virginia Pharmacy, the United States Supreme Court formulated
the modem commercial speech doctrine by decisively ruling that
the First Amendment protects commercial speech.5 6 Specifically,
the Court considered a Virginia statute that forbade pharmacists
from advertising the prices of prescription drugs.5 7
The Supreme Court rejected the board's arguments that the
ban would lead to decreased professionalism by licensed pharmacists,5 8 holding instead that the First Amendment's preference for
54 Id. at 429.
55 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); see Eberle, supra note 2, at 440-41 (labeling Virginia
Pharmacy the "seminal" case in the formation of the commercial speech doctrine).
56 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. The Virginia PharmacyCourt recognized that
"the notion of unprotected 'commercial speech' all but passed from the scene" in the
wake of Bigelow v. Virginia, decided by the Court in the previous term. Id. at 759
(citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975)). In Bigelow, the Court reversed
the conviction of a Virginia newspaper editor who had allowed the publication of
advertising announcing the availability of abortion services in New York City. Bigelow,
421 U.S. at 811-14, 829. In reversing the editor's conviction, the Bigelow Court reflected that the purpose of the First Amendment is to foster the dissemination of
opinions and information. Id. at 829. Cognizant that the subject matter of Bigelow,
which bordered on a political issue, may have left "some fragment of hope" for the
continued exclusion of commercial speech from First Amendment protection, the
Court resolved to clarify the issue. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760.
57 Id. at 749-50. The challenged law provided in pertinent part:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct
who ... publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any
manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate
or credit terms for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (Michie 1974).
The controversy arose when consumers challenged the statute, believing they
would benefit from the competition that would result from the publication of prescription drug prices. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 753. Stipulated facts at trial revealed that drug prices had a great deal of variance. Id. at 754 n. 11. The parties
further stipulated that in some cities prices for the same drug could vary by as much
as 1200%. Id.
58 Id. at 766, 770. Virginia defended its statute, claiming that removal of the ban
would lead to decreased professionalism by licensed pharmacists which, in turn, could
lead to consumer harm. Id. at 766-67. The Virginia Board of Pharmacy feared that
increased competition between pharmacists would have several negative effects on
both the profession and on consumers. Id. at 767-68. For example, the board postulated, as customers abandoned their regular pharmacists in search of the lowest
prices, pharmacists would lose their ability to monitor their customers' health
problems. Id. at 768. The board contended, in addition, that lifting the ban on advertising would lower the quality of customer service as conscientious pharmacists
would be forced to sacrifice the availability of professional services in the handling,
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the flow of information extended generally to commercial advertising. 59 The Court, while expressly granting First Amendment protection to commercial speech, nevertheless declined to foreclose
limitations on that protection.6" As a final caveat, the Supreme
Court constrained a uniform application of the commercial speech
doctrine to professionals, resolving instead that the constitutionality of restrictions on professional commercial speech would be determined by the characteristics of the affected profession.6"
Scarcely a year later, the Supreme Court confronted the application of the First Amendment to attorney advertising in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona.6 2 The Bates Court contemplated whether lawyers should be allowed to advertise their fees for standard services
with First Amendment impunity.6 3 Arizona's highest court cencompounding, and dispensing of prescriptions. Id. at 767-68. Finally, the board argued that advertising prices would reduce the public image of a pharmacist from a
"skilled and specialized craftsman" to "that of a mere retailer." Id. at 768. Such a
result, the board maintained, would impair the profession from attracting new talent
and, further, would weaken the professional practices of current members. Id. The
Court labelled the board's arguments "paternalistic," asserting that the State's
method of protecting its citizens was to keep them in ignorance. Id. at 769, 770; see
Eberle, supra note 2, at 455 (maintaining that public ignorance does not promote
First Amendment values, such as the furtherance of knowledge, veracity, and
individualism).
59 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. The Court pointed out that while there are
dangers both in suppressing and in misusing information that is freely available, the
First Amendment prefers the free flow of information to the alternative. Id.
60 Id. at 771-72 & n.24. The Court qualified the protection given to commercial
speech, stating in a footnote that there are "commonsense differences between
speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction' . . . and other
varieties." Id. at 772 n.24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
61 Id. at 773 & n.25. The Court noted that there are historical and functional
differences between professions, necessitating varying considerations and analyses in
the application of First Amendment protections. Id. at 773 n.25. The Court specifically mentioned physicians and lawyers as candidates for lower First Amendment protection because of the variety of services they offer and the increased potential for
confusion and deception that could arise from advertising, if such advertising was
permitted. Id.
62 433 U.S. 350, 353 (1977). Bates is considered to be the "single most important
case" in the area of attorney advertising. Gregg R. Brown, Comment, Advertising in the
"LearnedProfessions": The Casefor Price Comparisons and Testimonials, 11 S. ILL. U. L.J.
1205, 1217-18 (1987). As a result of the Bates decision, regulations affecting attorney
advertising took two forms. Miragliotta, supra note 2, at 601. The "narrow" reading of
Bates led some states to adopt the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which
includes a "'laundry list'" of the types of information allowed in attorney advertising.
Id. at 601-02. Alternatively, a "broad" reading of Bates led other states to adopt the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which merely proscribe false or deceptive advertising. Id. at 601; see also Maute, supra note 9, at 500 (describing the controversy
that erupted in the wake of Bates in the various state bar associations).
63 Bates, 433 U.S. at 367-68.
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sured two attorneys for violating state law by placing advertisements
concerning their firm in a local newspaper.6 4 The United States
Supreme Court rejected the state bar association's argument that
lifting the ban on attorney advertising would result in harm to both
the legal profession and the public.6 5 Instead, the Court concluded that except where actual or inherent harm is involved, the
First Amendment prevents states from enforcing blanket bans on
attorney advertising.6 6 The Bates Court recognized, however, the
difficulty in identifying, in every situation, speech that is inherently
harmful, but suggested that in-person solicitation might belong in
67
that category of unprotected expression.
64 Id. at 358. The order of censure affected two law partners, John Bates and Van
O'Steen. See In re Bates, 555 P.2d 640, 646 (Ariz. 1976). The disciplinary rule provided in pertinent part that "[a] lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or
associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper... advertisements." Bates, 433 U.S. at 355 (citation omitted).
65 Id. at 368. The state bar association asserted that lifting the ban on advertising
would negatively affect the public's perception of the importance of the legal profession, affect attorneys' own sense of professional dignity, and result in a loss of trust by
clients for their attorney. Id. The bar also argued that lifting the ban on attorney
advertising would lead to a public perception of lawyers as profit-oriented. Id. The
Court rejected that argument, referring to other professionals, namely bankers and
engineers, who advertise without a loss of dignity. Id. at 369-70.
The state bar association further contended that legal advertising was inherently
misleading. Id. at 372. The bar's basis for this contention was that attorney services
are specifically honed to the particular client and case, making an accurate quote of a
standard fee impossible. Id. In addition, the board argued, a lay client cannot discern or monitor what services the client's case may require. Id. Finally, the board
posited, attorney advertising would focus on extraneous factors brought out in advertisements rather than on the attorney's skills. Id. The Court dismissed each of these
assertions as well, declaring that uncontested actions were fungible enough tojustify a
single fee quote. Id. at 372-73.
In addition, the Court summarily rejected as "dubious at best" the bar's arguments that advertising would result in increased legal fees to pay for advertising. Id. at
377. Likewise, the Court found no merit in the state bar association's concerns over
clients receiving a standardized package of legal services not attuned to the client's
needs. Id. at 378. The Court hypothesized that attorneys who produce shoddy work
will continue to do so regardless of advertising rules. Id. Finally, the Court dismissed
the state bar association's concerns over the difficulty of policing attorney advertising.
Id. at 379. Instead, the Court chose to believe that most lawyers would "abide by their
solemn oaths to uphold the integrity and honor of their profession and of the legal
system." Id.
66 Id. at 383. Some commentators argue that although other types of speech, such
as political and cultural expression, should be protected regardless of their veracity,
the purpose of granting First Amendment protection to commercial speech is to provide reliable information about products and services to consumers. See, e.g., Collins
& Skover, supra note 7, at 737, 73940 (arguing that commercial information, not
image, should receive First Amendment protection). See supra note 1 for a discussion
of the tests used by the Court to determine whether First Amendment protection
extends to a particular expression.
67 Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. While the Court was unable to give a definitive answer as
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Although the Bates Court first hinted that in-person solicitation by attorneys might fall outside of the First Amendment's protection of commercial expressions, the Supreme Court formally
announced this exception to the commercial speech doctrine in
Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAss'n.68 In Ohralik, the Supreme Court considered whether the enforcement of a regulation6 9 banning attorney solicitation was constitutional in light of the Court's recent
expansion of the First Amendment to include commercial
speech.7" Affirming the suspension of an attorney convicted of violating Ohio's Administrative Code, the Court declared that the rule
did not infringe upon the First Amendment.7 1 In reaching its decision, the Court weighed the competing interests and concluded
that society's interest in preventing a lawyer's solicitation of accident victims outweighed Ohralik's interest in engaging in protected commercial speech.7 2 Furthermore, the Court agreed with
the state's justification for the prophylactic ban on attorney solicitation, noting the compelling nature of the state's interest in
preventing potentially harmful activity."
to what constitutes misleading commercial speech by attorneys, the majority stated
that non-verifiable claims of attorney quality or questionable communications made
during an in-person solicitation by the attorney mightjustify restrictions. Id.; see also
Eberle, supra note 2, at 470 (positing that "[c]ommercial speech can be verified").
68 436 U.S. 447 (1978). At least one commentator disagreed with the Court's holding in Ohralik, describing the decision as a shift from the clear application of the First
Amendment in Bates to an ad hoc approach. Maute, supra note 9, at 510 & n.140.
69 The law, DR 2-103 of the Rules Governing the Courts of Ohio, provides: "A
lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his
partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer...." RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF OHIO § DR 2-103(A) (1970).
Additionally, section DR 2-104(A) adds: "A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to
a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice...." RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF OHIO § DR 2104(A) (1970).
70 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454. Ohralik, an attorney, learned of an automobile accident and travelled to the hospital where the teenage victims had been taken. Id. at
449. Although Ohralik was able to meet only one of the two victims at the hospital, he
eventually met with both and convinced them to retain him for personal injury
claims. Id. at 450-51. Ohralik filed breach of contract actions against one of the teenagers after the teen discharged him and refused to pay Ohralik's legal fees. Id. at 452
& n.7. Both victims filed grievance complaints against Ohralik with the county bar
association. Id. at 452. The case eventually reached the state supreme court where
Ohralik was suspended indefinitely from the practice of law in Ohio for violating
Ohio's ban on attorney solicitation. Id. at 453-54.
71 Id. at 468.
72 Id. at 457-68; see also Eberle, supra note 2, at 502 (arguing that in Ohralik, the
government's interests were of such a compelling nature that the Court subordinated
the usual favoritism of free speech over government regulation).
73 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-67. The Ohralik Court submitted that the state law banning attorney solicitation was especially justified due to the inherently coercive situa-
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The Supreme Court's decisions from Virginia Pharmacy
through Ohralik failed to define precisely the scope of the Court's
protection of commercial speech. 4 When the Court considered
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York, 75 however, the Justices explicated the specific factors to
be considered in determining whether a particular expression of
commercial speech would receive First Amendment protection.7 6
In CentralHudson, the Court was presented with a challenge by
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation (Central Hudson) to a
regulation imposed by the Public Service Commission of the State
of New York (Commission) prohibiting advertising by energy utilities. 7 7 The Court recognized the particularly substantial interest
asserted by New York in restricting the utility's encouragement of
energy consumption during the "energy crisis" of the mid-1970s.78
Nevertheless, the Court found the total restriction on utility advertion of "a professional trained in the art of persuasion" soliciting an "unsophisticated,
injured, or distressed lay person." Id. at 465. The mainstream American legal community had long rejected solicitation as a method of attracting clients partly because
of the inherent harm involved. Maute, supra note 9, at 508.
74 See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Freedom of Speech, Press and Association, Scope of
Protectionfor Commercial Speech Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 94 HARv. L. REv. 159, 159 (1980) [hereinafter Scope of Protection].
75 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
76 Scope of Protection, supra note 74, at 159 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
The Central Hudson Court announced four specific factors to be weighed in determining whether the First Amendment applies to a particular commercial expression. Id.
First, the Court mandated that the commercial speech in question be truthful and
concern a legal activity. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Second, the Court required
that the government's interest be substantial if the restriction of commercial speech is
sought. Id. Third, the CentralHudson majority announced that the government's restriction of speech must directly advance the government's interest. Id. Finally, the
Court required that the restriction be no more extensive than necessary. Id. The
Court's balancing test in Central Hudson can be compared to the Court's traditional
approach to weighing time, place, or manner restrictions on other types of speech.
See, e.g., Elisabeth A. Langworthy, Note, Time, Place, Or MannerRestrictions On Commercial Speech, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 127, 128-29 (1984) (arguing that the similarity in
the approaches taken by the Court in speech restriction cases is not surprising, because government interests in restricting speech-whether by commercial content or
by time, place, or manner restrictions-are unrelated to the unambiguous language
of the First Amendment).
77 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558-61.
78 Id. at 568. The regulation was propounded during the period of time in the
mid-1970s which was characterized by the "energy crisis." Id. at 559, 572 n.15; see Scope
of Protection,supra note 74, at 164 (referring to the "severity of the energy crisis" at the
time of the Commission's restriction on utility advertising). The CentralHudson Court
labeled the connection between the advertising prohibition and the reduction in offpeak power usage "highly speculative." CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 569. Based on the
lack of a strong possibility for the ban on advertising to affect power consumption, the
Court declined to find justification for the curtailment of Central Hudson's advertising. Id.

1994]

NOTE

1597

tising to be more extensive than necessary to serve New York's interest. 79 Consequently, the Court held the Commission's
comprehensive proscription of utility advertising to be an unconstitutional infringement of speech. 0
With Central Hudson providing a guideline to cases involving
the commercial speech doctrine, National Funeral Services, Inc., v.
Rockefellers l furnishes a recent example of the limited application of
the First Amendment to commercial solicitation by professionals.8 2
In National Funera, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered the constitutional implications of a West
Virginia statute banning certain telephonic or in-person solicitation of pre-need funeral services.8 " The court of appeals applied
the Supreme Court's Central Hudson analysis and determined that
the statute directly served a substantial state interest and was not
more extensive than necessary.8 4 Accordingly, the circuit court af79 Id. at 569-70.

Id. at 572.
870 F.2d 136 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966 (1989).
See R. George Wright, Free Speech and the MandatedDisclosure of Information, 25 U.
RiCH. L. REv. 475, 488 n.85 (1991) (maintaining that National Funeral represents a
rationale for increased government regulation of groups that engage in certain types
of solicitation).
83 National Funera, 870 F.2d at 137-38. The law provided, in pertinent part, that a
seller of contracts for pre-need funeral services shall not:
(a) (1) Directly or indirectly call upon individuals or persons in hospitals, rest homes, nursing homes or similar institutions for the purpose of
soliciting pre-need funeral contracts or making funeral or final disposition arrangements without first having been specifically requested by
such person to do so;...
(3) Solicit relatives of persons whose death is apparently pending or
whose death has recently occurred for the purpose of providing funeral
services, final disposition, burial or funeral goods for such person; ...
(5) Solicit by telephone call or by visit to a personal residence, unless
such solicitation has been previously requested by the person solicited
or by a family member residing at such residence.
W. VA. CODE § 47-14-10 (a) (1), (3) & (5) (1992).
84 National Funera4 870 F.2d at 142-45. The court found that the state had a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from a situation charged with the potential
for overreaching and coercion due to the delicate subject matter involved. Id. at 142.
The court further determined that the law, which prohibited solicitation only to those
most susceptible of being swayed by emotion, directly served the state's interest without being more extensive than necessary. Id. at 144-45 (citations omitted). In finding
the fourth prong of Central Hudson to be satisfied, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
"least restrictive" interpretation of the "not more extensive than is necessary" language of the fourth prong of Central Hudson. Id. (citations omitted). Instead, the
Fourth Circuit applied a "reasonable relation" approach, asking whether the state's
ban of pre-need funeral services solicitation reasonably furthered the government's
interests. Id. at 145 (citation omitted).
Before the Supreme Court ultimately decided the issue, various federal circuits
analyzed the fourth prong of Central Hudson differently. See Todd J. Locher, Coin80
81
82
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firmed the district court'sjudgment that the law did not violate the
First Amendment.8 5 In addition to finding that the statute satisfied
the Central Hudson standard, the court of appeals further justified
the law by declaring the supremacy of the fundamental right to
privacy over the First Amendment's protection of commercial
speech. 6
With the above line of cases providing a judicial landscape for
ment, Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox: Cutting Back on
Commercial Speech Standards,75 IOWA L. REv. 1335, 1341 & nn.59-60 (1990) (comparing, for example, the dissimilar results achieved by the Second and Third Circuits in
Fox v. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N. Y., 841 F.2d 1207, 1214 (2d Cir. 1988)
(applying a "least restrictive" analysis) and American Future Sys. v. Pennsylvania State
Univ., 752 F.2d 854, 865 (3d Cir. 1984) (rejecting the "least restrictive" interpretation
of the fourth prong of CentralHudson)). In Board of Trustees of the State University of New
York v. Fox, the Supreme Court rejected the "least restrictive" approach utilized by the
Second Circuit, effectively easing the government's burden of justifying a restriction
on commercial speech. Locher, supra, at 1347 (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 477).
In Fox, the State University of New York at Cortland's campus police prevented
American Future Systems, Inc. (AFS) from conducting "Tupperware parties" in a student's dormitory room because such activity violated a university resolution. Fox, 492
U.S. at 471-72. The resolution stated:
No authorization will be given to private commercial enterprises to operate on State University campuses or in facilities furnished by the University other than to provide for food, legal beverages, campus
bookstore, vending, linen supply, laundry, dry cleaning, banking, barber and beautician services and cultural events.
Id. (citation omitted). Fox, along with other students, sued the University, claiming
that the resolution violated the First Amendment. Id. at 472. The district court found
for the University, declaring inter alia the reasonableness of the university's restriction
of commercial speech. Id. (citations omitted). The Second Circuit reversed and remanded for a finding of whether the restriction on the AFS representative's speech
was the least restrictive means available to fulfill the state university's asserted interest.
Id. at 472-73 (citing Fox, 841 F.2d at 1214). Reversing the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court declared that the fourth prong of Central Hudson did not require a
perfect fit between the state's asserted interest and the restriction imposed by the
state. Id. at 480, 486. Rather, the Fox Court required that the restriction on commercial speech be reasonably tailored to serve the state's substantial interest. Id. at 480.
The Supreme Court found a substantial interest in the state's desire to promote an
educational rather than a commercial atmosphere on state university campuses. Id. at
475. The Court remanded the case, however, for a determination of the validity of
the state's restrictions on AFS's commercial speech under the reasonable fit standard.
Id. at 486.
85 NationalFunera4 870 F.2d at 146. The district court held that the restriction on
solicitation represented a legitimate content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation. Id. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding instead that the regulations were content-based. Id. Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the inherent harm in
soliciting potential customers of pre-need funeral services justified the state's restriction of that form of speech. Id. at 142. But see Eberle, supra note 2, at 445-46 (discussing the First Amendment principle that content-based restrictions on speech are
strongly disfavored).
86 NationalFunera4 870 F.2d at 146. The court refused to "consign the privacy of
the home to the second chair." Id.
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the commercial speech doctrine, the United States Supreme Court
decided Edenfield v. Fane.87 In Edenfield, the Court considered
whether certified public accountants could be completely banned
from personally soliciting prospective clients.8 8 Justice Kennedy,
writing for a seven Justice majority, stressed that the Court would
not consider whether certain aspects of Fane's speech were more
deserving of First Amendment protection than others, but instead
would consider only the constitutionality of the blanket ban on accountant solicitation.8 9
Beginning its review of the case, the Court categorized Fane's
proposed solicitation as commercial speech and recognized such
speech to be generally deserving of First Amendment protection.9 °
The Court noted that the subject matter of Fane's proposed solicitation was truthful and did not pertain to an illegal act.9 1 Having
satisfied Central Hudson's first prong, Justice Kennedy recognized
that the relationship of commercial speech to commercial transac87 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993). Edenfield represented the Court's first review of commercial professional solicitation since Ohralik See generallyCoots, supranote 13, at 1188-89
(discussing the reliance of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on Ohralik in its
consideration of Fane v. Edenfield). The Supreme Court decided an additional case
involving attorney solicitation prior to deciding Edenfield. See In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 414 (1978). In Primus, an American Civil Liberties Union attorney solicited an
indigent woman who was forced to undergo sterilization to keep her welfare benefits.
Id. at 415-16. The Primus Court held that the state's application of its anti-attorney
solicitation law to the attorney's non-profit motivated solicitation of a prospective client violated the First Amendment. Id. at 433, 439. The Edenfield majority confined
the scope of its analysis to cases involving commercial solicitation by professionals and
therefore made no reference to Primus. Edenfild, 113 S.Ct. at 1796-1804.
88 Id. at 1796. Implicit in the framing of the issue by Justice Kennedy was the need
for the Court to determine whether the constitutionality of a ban on attorney solicitation could be extended to cover a similar ban on accountant solicitation. Id. See
generally King, supra note 13, at 562 & n.13 (recognizing that while the Virginia Pharmacy Court had granted First Amendment protection to professional advertising, the
Ohralik Court had not extended such protection to attorney solicitation).
89 Edenfield, 113 S.Ct. at 1796-97. Justice Kennedy asserted that the controversy
concerned the constitutionality of the ban on solicitation and "nothing more." Id. at
1797.
90 Id. (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). But see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973) (holding that the illegal nature of
running gender specific advertising rendered the First Amendment inapplicable).
Recognizing personal solicitation to be a form of commercial speech, the Court explained that Virginia Pharmacy did not expressly remove personal solicitation from the
realm of protected commercial speech. Edenfield, 113 S.Ct. at 1797. The Court further observed that focusing only on the harms that can result from personal solicitation ignores the positive First Amendment attributes of this type of communication,
such as allowing a broader exchange of information between a buyer and seller. Id. at
1797-98.
91 Id. at 1797.
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tions, which the state has a right to regulate, removed such speech
from the highest level of First Amendment protection.9 2 Accordingly, the Court determined that CentralHudson provided the appropriate analysis for reviewing the constitutionality of the
challenged law.9"
Continuing its application of CentralHudson, the Court articulated that Florida and its Board of Accountancy satisfied Central
Hudson's second prong-that the state establish a substantial interest in support of the restriction of speech. 4 Specifically, the majority recognized that the state's concern for protecting its population
from exposure to fraud, duress, or other harmful speech made by
soliciting accountants represented a substantial interest. 5 In addition, Justice Kennedy observed, Florida's concern with protecting
the privacy of its citizens also qualified as a substantial interest. 6
Finally, the Court noted that Florida had a substantial interest in
maintaining the independence of certified public accountants in
an effort to keep them free from potential conflicts of interest. 7
The majority next considered the third prong of Central Hudson-whether the restriction of speech directly served the substantial interests asserted by the state through its Board of
Accountancy.9 8 Justice Kennedy, agreeing with the circuit court,
92 Id. at 1798. The Court referred to Ohralik to demonstrate that the state's interest in regulating an underlying commercial transaction can justify the state's regulation of the commercial speech associated with the transaction. Id. (citing Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978)); see also Eberle, supra note 2, at 502
(proposing that the state's heightened interest in the underlying transaction in
Ohralik was so compelling that it overwhelmed, in that specific circumstance, the First
Amendment's protection of commercial speech).
93 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1798. As a threshold matter, the Court accepted that
Fane's proposed solicitation involved only the dissemination of true information that
was not misleading or concerning an illegal matter. Id. at 1797. Utilizing the Central
Hudson test, including the Court's interpretation of the fourth prong in Board of Trustees v. Fox, the Edenfield Court required that the law restricting Fane's speech be based
on a substantial government interest, directly further that interest, and do so in a
manner reasonably related to that interest. Id. at 1798. See supra note 19 for a recitation of the regulation at issue in Edenfield.
94 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1799.

95 Id.
96 Id.; cf National Funeral Servs., Inc., v. Rockefeller, 870 F.2d 136, 146 (4th Cir.)
(holding that the right to privacy supersedes the right to free speech when the speech
in question merely concerns a commercial transaction), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966
(1989).
97 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800. Although the majority recognized the state's interest in preserving accountant independence, Justice Kennedy doubted the state
board's assertion that accountants who solicit are more likely to participate in ethical
misconduct. Id.
98 Id. Justice Kennedy described Central Hudson's third hurdle to be "the penultimate prong" of the analysis. Id.
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found that the law was unable to withstand this strict requirement
insofar as the solicitation of business clients was concerned. 99 Specifically, the Justice declared, the state board had not supplied any
proof, other than an affidavit of negligible evidentiary value, that
harm in the business community would result from lifting the ban
on in-person accountant solicitation.' 0 0 In the absence of such
proof, the Court held, the State Board could not sustain its argument that the ban on solicitation directly advanced the state's substantial interests.1 0' Further, the Court summarily rejected the
Board's alternate contention that the restriction was content-neutral.10 2 Justice Kennedy doubted that a total ban on speech could
be considered content-neutral.' 0 3 The Justice held, however, that a
content-neutral designation would not alleviate the law's failure to
directly and materially further the state's interest.' 4
Next, the majority discarded the Board's interpretation of
Ohralik as providing justification for a preventative ban on solicitation by all professionals, including certified public accountants.'0 5
Rather, the Court found the Board's reliance on Ohralik to be misplaced because restrictions on solicitation are determined by the
relationship of the parties to each other in the context of the solicitation.' 6 Ruling that Ohralik did not apply to accountant solicita99 Id. The Court found it settled law that for a state to restrict speech, the state
must demonstrate an identifiable harm that the restriction would fundamentally alleviate. Id. (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648-49
(1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 205-06 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13,
15 (1979); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977)); see
also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983) (citations omitted) (ruling that "[tihe party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech
carries the burden ofjustifying it").
100 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800-01. The affidavit of Louis Dooner, a former chairman of the Florida Board of Accountancy, asserted that if the ban on solicitation by
accountants was lifted, certified public accountants would lose the necessary independence to perform the "attest function" which could lead to harmful and unethical
conduct. Id. at 1797. See supra note 23 for an explanation of the attest function. In
response to Dooner's affidavit, Justice Kennedy observed that a report of a committee
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants contradicted Dooner's assertions. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1801. Particularly, the Justice recognized, the report
noted the absence of any data suggesting that the solicitation of clients by accountants
had led to a loss of accountant independence. Id. (citation omitted).
101 Id. at 1800.

Id. at 1801.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1802. The Court reaffirmed that "a preventative rule was justified only in
situations 'inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct.'" Id.
(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978)).
106 Id.; see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council,
102
103
104
105
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tion, Justice Kennedy distinguished attorneys from accountants
based upon the nature of their respective training. 10 7 In particular,
the Justice propounded that an attorney's training as an advocate
imparts skills that, when combined with a financial interest, can
greatly lend themselves to overreaching or coercion. 10 8 Conversely, the Justice recognized that certified public accountants receive training in objectivity that does not entail the same likelihood
of harm. 10 9
As a final matter, the Court distinguished the context of the
solicitation in Ohralik from the present facts. 11 ° The majority posited that the attorney's solicitation of injured teenagers in Ohralik
differed greatly from Fane's solicitation of savvy corporate executives."' Justice Kennedy noted that while the Ohralik victims were
naive and inexperienced in hiring an attorney, Fane's prospective
clients had the necessary expertise to make an informed decision
on the selection of a certified public accountant.1 1 2 Unlike the situation in Ohralik, the majority concluded that the risk of harm to
Fane's prospective clients was not inherent. 1 3 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, having determined
that there was no justification for a prophylactic ban on certified
public accountant solicitation because the restriction did not diInc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1976) (maintaining that "the distinctions, historical and
functional, between professions, may require consideration of quite different
factors").
107 Edenfie/d 113 S. Ct. at 1802-03.
108 Id. at 1802. Specifically, Justice Kennedy quoted Ohralik which explained that a
great potential for harmful overreaching exists " ' when a lawyer, a professional trained
in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed
lay person.'" Id. (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465). Further, the Justice hypothesized
that potential legal clients may entrust their cases to a soliciting attorney without regard to the attorney's ability to handle the particular controversy and without opportunity to reflect upon the necessity of representation. Id. (citation omitted).
109 Id. at 1802-03. The Justice also noted that a typical prospective client of a CPA is
less easy to manipulate than the naive accident victims in Ohralik Id. at 1803.
110 Id.
111 Id. Justice Kennedy recognized that Fane's method of solicitation encourages
rational and considerate decisionmaking by prospective clients of CPA services, in
marked divergence to the immediate, unconditional acquiescence of the Ohralik accident victims to legal representation. Id.
112 Id. The Court also noted that unlike the accident victim Ohralik met personally
in the hospital, Fane's proposed solicitation would take place over the telephone,
giving the executive the ability to terminate the solicitation by simply hanging-up. Id.
Therefore, the Court dismissed the right to privacy as a viable issue. Id. Contra National Funeral Servs., Inc., v. Rockefeller, 870 F.2d 136, 144 (4th Cir.) (finding that
telemarketing, like in-person solicitation, contains elements that threaten a consumer's privacy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966 (1989).
113 EdenjrkL 113 S. Ct. at 1803.
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14
rectly and materially serve the state's substantial interests.'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun reiterated the position espoused in the Justice's City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc. concurrence.' 15 While the concurrence agreed with the result
reached by the majority in the present case, Justice Blackmun ex-

Id. at 1803-04.
Id. at 1804 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1517-21 (1993) (Blackmun,J., concurring)). The dispute in Discovery Network began when the City of Cincinnati notified two distributors of
promotional materials that it had revoked their permits to dispense advertisements on
city property. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1508. Accordingly, the City ordered the
distributors to remove their newsracks from public property within thirty days. Id.
The ordinance at issue stated:
No person shall throw or deposit any commercial or non-commercial
handbill in or upon any sidewalk, street or other public place within the
city. Nor shall any person hand out or distribute or sell any commercial
handbill in any public place. Provided, however, that it shall not be
unlawful on any sidewalk, street or other public place within the city for
any person to hand out or distribute, without charge to the receiver
thereof, any non-commercial handbill to any person willing to accept it,
except within or around the city hall building.
CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 714-23 (1992). The city justified the ordinance
on its interest in public safety and aesthetics. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1507.
Cincinnati posited that its ban on the distribution of commercial flyers, but not on
the distribution of traditional newspapers, represented a constitutionally permissible
method for the city to serve its asserted interest. Id. at 1509 (citation and footnote
omitted). In so arguing, the city highlighted the Court's application of a lower standard of First Amendment protection to commercial speech. Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980)
(citation omitted)). Justice Stevens, writing for the Discovery Network majority, affirmed the Court's grant of lesser constitutional protection to commercial speech. Id.
at 1507, 1513 (citations omitted). The Court found, however, that Cincinnati's ordinance did not meet the "reasonable fit" requirement of Board of Trustees v. Fox. Id. at
1513-14. Specifically, the Court determined that the city's distinction between the
distribution of commercial and noncommercial publications bore no relationship at
all to its stated interests, finding that Discovery Network's newsracks presented "no
greater an eyesore" than those newsracks not affected by the ordinance. Id. at 1514.
The Court ruled, accordingly, that Cincinnati's ban on the dispersal of commercial
advertisements on city property violated Discovery Network's First Amendment right
of free speech. Id. at 1517.
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the result, disagreed with the Court's continued
reliance on a lower standard of First Amendment protection for nondeceptive commercial speech relating to lawful activities. Id. at 1517 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Instead, the Justice argued that no reason exists for treating truthful commercial
speech as having less First Amendment value than other types of speech. Id. at 1518
(Blackmun, J., concurring). The Justice concluded that the Court's continued bias
against commercial speech, regardless of the veracity of the commercial speech at
issue, made it appear to Cincinnati that the city "had no choice under this Court's
decisions but to burden commercial newsracks more heavily." Id. at 1520 (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (citation omitted). For a more detailed analysis of the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., see Scott S. Servilla,
Note, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1089 (1993).
114
115
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pressed dissatisfaction with only affording middle-tier protection to
16
commercial speech that does not contain harmful elements.'
11 7
Justice O'Connor authored the sole dissenting opinion.
The Justice fundamentally disagreed with the extension of First
Amendment protection to learned professionals engaging in commercial speech." 8 Rather than restricting professional advertising
on grounds that it is harmful, false, or misleading, Justice
O'Connor advocated granting states the authority to proscribe
commercial speech that is incongruous with the status ascribed to
learned professions."1 The dissent premised this position on the
ground that competition between professionals in search of finan1 20
cial gain leads to the abandonment of professional altruism.
Justice O'Connor also disagreed with the Court's distinction
between attorneys and certified public accountants who engage in
solicitation.1 2 1 The dissent contended that the professional's certified status and specialized expertise in a sophisticated area-not
rhetorical training as the majority maintained-create the opportunity for undue captivation of potential clients. 122 Justice
O'Connor maintained that such captivation could too easily lead to
a professional's use of coercion or other harmful speech to the
benefit of the professional and the detriment of the client.1 23 Ac116 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1804 (Blackmun,J., concurring). Compare id. (continuing
to eschew a middle-tier analysis of truthful commercial speech) with Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (declaring that "the consumer's concern for the
free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent
political dialogue").
117 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct at 1804-06 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "Court took a wrong
turn with Bates v. State Bar of Arizona").
119 Id. The Justice stated that post-Bates cases that expanded the rights of attorneys
to advertise expounded the diminishment of professional status begun by Bates. Id.
(citations omitted). The Justice cited, for example, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinay
Counse4 where the Court struck down an Ohio law insofar as it prohibited attorneys
from engaging in certain forms of print advertising. Id. (citing Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650, 655 (1985)). In Zauderer, the advertising at
issue included an attorney's dissemination of generic legal advice and use of illustrations in newspaper advertisements. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629. Justice O'Connor dissented to the Zauderermajority's declaration that Ohio violated the First Amendment
by restricting attorney advertising. Id. at 673, 676-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment & dissenting in part).
120 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that
"[c] ommercialization has an incremental, indirect, yet profound effect on professional
culture, as lawyers know all too well").
121 Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122 Id. Justice O'Connor asserted that the Florida legislature could rationally believe that CPAs, like attorneys, could easily overwhelm unsophisticated clients. Id.
123 Id. Justice O'Connor proffered that many instances of in-person solicitations
contain elements which inherently may cause harm to the prospective client. Id. A
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cordingly, Justice O'Connor agreed with Florida's decision to proin order to prevent harmful activity
scribe accountant solicitation
1 24
before it could occur.

Likewise, Justice O'Connor disapproved of the majority's approach to the scope of Fane's challenge to Florida's law. 1 25 Particularly, the Justice disagreed with the majority's analysis of the
126
controversy as an "as-applied" rather than a facial challenge.
The dissent argued that under a facial challenge, Florida's law
would satisfy CentralHudson because the analysis would call on the
Court to give broad deference to Florida's legislature.1 27 Additionally, Justice O'Connor opined, the Court's application of Central
Hudson to Fane's applied challenge represented an implicit finding
by the majority that Florida's law was facially constitutional.1 28 The
Justice, accordingly, questioned the majority's unstated assumption
that First Amendment protection could be invoked for specific expressions of commercial speech, even where the underlying proscriptive law facially satisfies the four-part CentralHudson test. 129 As
a final matterJustice O'Connor insisted that the injunctive remedy
prohibiting enforcement of the law to all certified public accountants was improperly broad and therefore inconsistent with the narrow scope of an as-applied challenge. 3 ° Moreover, the Justice
reasonable legislator, the Justice continued, could believe that these potentially harmful solicitations are impossible to isolate preemptively, justifying a prophylactic ban.
Id.
124 Id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126 Id. Justice O'Connor argued that the majority carefully avoided addressing the
plaintiff's dispute of the ban as a facial challenge by treating Fane's suit as an asapplied challenge. Id. Unlike a facial challenge, where the Court will seek to find any
reasonable rationale to uphold a contested statute, a successful as-applied challenge
will merely invalidate the law in a specific application. CRUMP, supra note 1, at 813.
Justice O'Connor asserted that the majority's affirmance of the district court's broad
injunction against enforcement of Florida's statute was inconsistent with the Court's
treatment of the case as an as-applied challenge. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1805-06
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissenting Justice declared the Court's
determination-that this particular respondent's proposed solicitation would not target vulnerable clients-to be inconsistent with the district court's broad injunction.
Id.
127 Id. at 1805, 1806 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 1806 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Citing Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox, Justice O'Connor argued that the Fox Court's
reasonable fit clarification of the fourth prong of Central Hudson appears to denote
that although the state's restriction may impede some non-objectionable commercial
speech, if the law fulfills CentralHudson it is valid without exception. Id. (citing Board
of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-86 (1989)).
130 Id. at 1805-06 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor proposed that lifting the solicitation restriction extended far beyond Fane's proposed speech. Id. at
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disagreed that the majority's limitation of the injunction to nonbusiness contexts provided a sufficient basis for validating the district court's broad remedy.1 3 1 The dissent theorized that the Florida legislature could have rationally based a restriction on
accountant solicitation in the business community on its belief that

many small businesses are owned by individuals no more urbane
than private citizens with the means to hire a certified public accountant.1 3 2 Based on the aforementioned grounds, Justice
13 3
O'Connor would have reversed the court of appeals.
Edenfield v. Fane represents the Supreme Court's recognition
that in-person commercial solicitation is not in and of itself an insidious occurrence.13 4 In fact, lower courts had already recognized

this principle to some extent several years prior to the Edenfield decision.1 3 5 In Edenfield, the Supreme Court retreated from its reactionary holding in Ohralik to its revolutionary extension of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech in Virginia Pharmacy
136
and Bates.
1805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice O'Connor argued, the district
court's finding that Fane's proposed speech would be harmless did not justify striking
down the ban. Id. at 1805-06 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting). Rather, the Justice declared,
such a result would have been proper only in a successful facial challenge. Id.
131 Id. at 1806 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
132 Id. Justice O'Connor recognized that the majority of enterprises in the United
States are considered small businesses. Id. (citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 526 (112th ed. 1992)).
133 Id.
134 See Eberle, supra note 2, at 504. In this passage, referring to the analogous prophylactic ban on solicitation in Ohralik, the author stated:
[T] he preferred position of free speech in our value structure demands
that such a ban apply only in those situations where one-sided, badgering, imminently coercive and harmful conduct is likely to occur ....
Certainly, in-person communications with respect to . . . fundamental
rights are permissible. There may even be room for truthful, noncoercive, nondeceptive in-person proposals of... commercial transactions if
those qualities could be ensured.
Id.
135 See, e.g., Project 80's, Inc., v. City of Pocatello, 942 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1991)
(ruling that in situations where door-to-door solicitation disseminates information in
the most efficient manner, courts should not curtail that mode of expression); Optimist Club of North Raleigh v. Riley, 563 F. Supp. 847, 848-49, 850 (E.D.N.C. 1982)
(holding that a complete ban on telephonic solicitation impinges the First Amendment rights of professional solicitors). But see United States v. State Bd. of Certified
Public Accountants of La., No. CIV.A.83-1947, 1987 WL 7905, at *7 (E.D. La. Mar. 11,
1987) (ruling that a restriction on accountant advertising and solicitation is allowed
when the challenged regulation furthers state policy).
. 136 The Court is still not free of the Ohralik mentality which accepted a preventative
rule tojustify the curtailment of free speech rather than require an actual showing of
harm. See Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1802 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 464 (1978)) (affirming the position taken in Ohralik that "a preventative rule
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By expanding the scope of the First Amendment to include
accountant solicitation, however, the Court once again entered the
thicket of controversy over the degree of First Amendment protection afforded to professionals engaging in solicitation.'7 The
boundaries of the controversy surrounding the application and
scope of First Amendment protection to professional solicitation
are illustrated by the opposing stances taken by Justices O'Connor
and Blackmun in Edenfield. Whereas Justice O'Connor would give
states the absolute authority to restrict the speech and behavior of
its professionals,1 38 Justice Blackmun would grant absolute First
Amendment protection to non-harmful commercial speech, regardless of the professional status of the speaker.1 39 However diametrically Justices O'Connor and Blackmun approached the
commercial speech controversy at issue in Edenfield, the analyses of
both the concurrence and dissent are more unfailing and forthright than that of the majority. The majority's seemingly ad hoc
application of the First Amendment to certified public accountants, in the face of the Court's prior denial of the same right to
attorneys in Ohralik, 4 ° suggests inconsistency and perhaps bias
was justified only in situations 'inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms
of misconduct'"); see also Redish, supra note 1, at 630 (postulating that commercial
speech is only slightly more protected today than it was before Virginia Pharmacy). See
generally Miragliotta, supra note 2, at 632 (maintaining that a showing of actual deception should be required before any type of ban on advertising is allowed); Maute,
supra note 9, at 511 (claiming that the presumption of injury standard allowed in
Ohralik is inconsistent with the commercial speech doctrine because it presumes, per
se, that speech causes harm).
137 See, e.g., Eberle, supra, note 2, at 485-86 (maintaining that professionals should
be allowed to solicit clients, but with a higher degree of government regulation that
would promote the state's significant interest in protecting vulnerable lay people
from undue influence). But see Maute, supra note 9, at 524 (arguing that there should
be no restrictions on professional advertising and solicitation unless such activity involves undue influence, fraud, or unconscionability).
138 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 488-91 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing

with the majority's continued application of the commercial speech doctrine to attorney advertising). In the Shapero dissent, Justice O'Connor maintained that state restrictions "act as a concrete, day-to-day reminder to the practicing attorney of why it is
improper for any member of this profession to regard it as a trade or occupation like
any other." Id. at 490 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139 Edenfie/d, 113 S. Ct. at 1804 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Without reference to
whether the speech in question is commercial,Justice Blackmun would grant full First
Amendment protection to expressions that do not contain elements of fraud or duress or advocate unlawful activity. Id.; City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 1505, 1517-21 (1993) (Blackmun,J., concurring). See supra note 115 for a
discussion of Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Discovery Network.
140 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978). The Court preserved
high professional standards in Ohralik for members of the legal community after re-
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against the legal profession.1 4 1 As the Court noted in Bates, each
Justice is a licensed attorney. 4 2 That fact may provide a subtext to
the Court's holding in Ohralik that is not present when the Court
considers the adverse effects of solicitation on the dignity of professions other than the bar, such as public accountants.
Litigation in this area will almost certainly continue due to the
variability intrinsic to the majority's reliance on context 143 in determining whether the commercial speech doctrine protects commercial expressions made by professionals. 4 4 The approaches taken
by Justices O'Connor and Blackmun would foreclose the need to
answer unresolved issues such as whether the First Amendment offers protection to attorney solicitation of prospective business clients. 145 Justice O'Connor's strict approach is untenable, however,
because it ignores the potential benefits professional solicitation
can afford to prospective clients.' 4 6 Therefore, while Edenfield
achieves an ideal First Amendment result by liberalizing the potential for the dissemination of information, its arbitrary methodology
for doing so does not yield the type of consistency and security to
fusing to legitimize the same argument made on behalf of the pharmacy profession in
Virginia Pharmacy. Compare id. (upholding a prophylactic ban on in-person solicitation
by attorneys) with Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (positing that commercial speech-the advertisement of
prescription drug prices-is protected by the First Amendment).
141 See Maute, supra note 9, at 502 (labelling the Court's application of the commercial speech doctrine as an ad hoc approach). Professor Maute contended that the
Court's approach to commercial speech cases involving professionals will create "doctrinal confusion and multiple tiers of scrutiny for commercial and other forms of
protected speech... [that] will inevitably affect the degree of protection given to core
First Amendment speech." Id.
142 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977).
143 See, e.g., Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1802 (proclaiming that "the constitutionality of a
ban on personal solicitation will depend upon the identity of the parties and the
precise circumstances of the solicitation").
144 See BOGEN, supra note 1, at 100 (contending that the Court's application of a
balancing test in commercial speech cases continues to be a source of litigation).
145 In Edenfie/d, the Court declared that accountants cannot be restricted from soliciting prospective clients in a business context, and distinguished Ohralik without addressing why a similar caveat would not have been appropriate in Ohralik. Edenfield,
113 S. Ct. at 1803.
146 See Eberle, supra note 2, at 503 (arguing that solicitation opens up a line of
communication from the seller to the buyer supplementing the traditional method of
information being exchanged only after the buyer initiated contact with the seller);
see also Smolla, supra note 7, at 785 (proposing that commercial speech provides
"color and life and quality" to people's lives); cf. Redish, supranote 1, at 595 (arguing
that "the Supreme Court should not determine the level of constitutional protection
by comparing the relative valtie of different types of speech"). But see HuMAN LIBERTY,
supra note 1, at 224 (postulating that market forces disconnect commercial speech
from furthering individual choices).
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professionals that Justice Blackmun's succinct and straight forward
analysis would provide. 147 The Supreme Court should abandon
the balancing test of Central Hudson1 48 and instead adopt the simplified requirement espoused by Justice Blackmun: that truthful
commercial speech not pertaining to an illegal act should receive
149
absolute First Amendment protection.
David P. Kalm

147 See Maute, supra note 9, at 502 (lamenting the Court's unfortunate ad hoc analysis of commercial speech restrictions). Professor Maute observed the present lack of
unanimity among jurisdictions in the area of regulating attorney advertising and solicitation. Id. at 514. Although adding to economic inefficiency, the author pragmatically advises that given the unsettled nature of the law in the commercial speech area
as applied to professionals, practitioners would do well to look into the local regulatory climate of the jurisdiction in which they choose to establish their practice. Id.
148 See supra note 76 (providing the four-prong balancing test of CentralHudson).
149 Edenfie/d, 113 S. Ct. at 1804 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

